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chapter 4
the Question of input, control and output 
legitimacy in economic rios
Bob reinalda
scholars disagree on the question of whether intergovernmental organizations 
(igos) have only output legitimacy, or also have input and control legitimacy. the 
same question may be asked of regional integration organizations (rios). Based 
on an analysis of 31 economic rios, this chapter will answer the question of 
whether economic rios contribute primarily to output legitimacy, as is generally 
assumed, or also contribute to input and control legitimacy. the chapter deals with 
the characteristics of economic rios relevant to legitimacy and presents in the 
last section the indicators which permit empirical research into the three forms of 
legitimacy within economic rios.
Two Conflicting Views
igos, according to robert dahl, are inherently ill-suited to democratic governance. 
he regards them as bureaucratic bargaining systems and argues that governments 
take decisions without much control by, or even awareness of, the citizens of the 
member states (Dahl 1999, 33–4; see also Erthal, chapter 3). The legitimacy of 
igos, according to dahl, is not to be found in their ‘democraticness’, but rather 
in their effectiveness, superior knowledge and concern for affected parties. elite 
bargaining in igos in terms of legitimacy as discussed in this volume is not a matter 
of ‘input’ or ‘control’ legitimacy, but rather of ‘output’ legitimacy. others, such 
as ruth grant and robert Keohane, argue that the authority of igos to act in the 
international arena is explicitly conferred on them by nation-states, which implies 
that they can be held accountable for their behaviour. for these authors, legitimacy 
depends on conformity to established international agreements and shared norms. 
the legal instruments here are the charters of the igos ‘that specify the procedures 
by which they have to act to make their rulings authoritative, defining what is often 
referred to as “input” or “process” legitimacy’ (Grant and Keohane 2005, 35). 
hence, they assume that input and control (or process) legitimacy may exist and 
can be recognized. the responsibilities of igos may become recognizable through 
the purposes, procedures and bodies mentioned in their charters with the aim of 
monitoring these responsibilities and providing checks and balances in the decision-
making process. igos may also be held to standards articulated in international 
law, for instance, if they violate human rights treaties or provisions of international 
courts or tribunals. the existence of these two views leaves us with the puzzle of 
whether legitimacy of igos is only a matter of effectiveness or output legitimacy (as 
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dahl, with his sceptical view, assumes), or also one of support and transparency or 
input and control legitimacy (as grant and Keohane, with their accountability view, 
suggest). Before defining indicators for the three forms of legitimacy I will elaborate 
further on economic RIOs specifically.
The Process of Integration and the Nation-State
in order to avoid the impression that there is only one successful example of 
regional integration which casts its shadow over other efforts, i will not take the 
western european integration process as my starting point, but rather the rise of 
economic regionalism, of which the european case is a part. economic regionalism 
has a dynamic, rather than static, character. cooperation between nation-states may 
evolve from less to more intensive forms, from free trade agreements to far-reaching 
integration. Bela Balassa’s range of five categories of integration starts with no tariffs 
or quotas (a free-trade area) and continues with the addition of, in turn, a common 
external tariff (a customs union), a free flow of production factors (a common 
market) and harmonization of economic policies (an economic union). it ends with 
unification of policies and political institutions (total economic integration) (Balassa 
1994). In reality, there are even more than these five categories. A preferential trade 
agreement, for instance, can be considered a weaker form of a free-trade area and 
a monetary union differs from an economic union. Some organizations do not fit 
Balassa’s range, because their function as ‘booster organizations’ remains restricted 
to encouraging regional free trade and/or economic cooperation. sometimes one 
of Balassa’s categories applies, but the RIO’s purposes reach beyond this specific 
category. the purpose of a customs union, for instance, may be to become a common 
market or monetary union, whereas in other RIOs, a customs union is the final 
destination. regionalism thus demonstrates its dynamic character. ‘early stages of 
integration tend to concentrate on the elimination of trade barriers and the formation 
of a customs union in goods. as integration proceeds, the agenda expands to cover 
non-tariff barriers, the regulation of markets, and the development of common 
policies at both the micro- and macro-levels’ (hurrell 2000, 43).
Andrew Hurrell clarifies this dynamic character by dividing regionalism into five 
categories, ranging from rather autonomous transnational economic networks within 
a certain region (that is, economic regionalization that is not based on the conscious 
policy of a group of states) to a cohesive and consolidated regional unit (which he 
calls ‘regional cohesion’). his second category refers to regional political activity 
in conjunction with common attitudes. regional awareness (or identity) matters 
because of the ‘shared understandings and the meanings given to political activity 
by the actors involved’ (hurrell 2000, 41). internal factors (religious traditions, 
history, or culture) as well as external factors (security threats or cultural challenges) 
may highlight common elements that promote more intense forms of cooperation 
than the original coincidental regionalization. his third category, ‘regional interstate 
cooperation’, follows on from this common understanding and serves as a ‘means 
of responding to external challenges and of co-ordinating regional positions in 
international institutions or negotiating forums’, or can be developed ‘to secure 
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welfare gains, to promote common values, or to solve common problems, especially 
problems arising from increased levels of regional interdependence’. whether this 
interstate cooperation is formal or informal, it is ‘very clearly statist, designed to 
protect and enhance the role of the state and the power of the government’ (hurrell 
2000, 42). this applies still more to his fourth category (‘state-promoted regional 
integration’), which is based on specific policy decisions by governments designed 
to reduce or remove barriers to the mutual exchange of goods, services, capital and 
people. In his final category regional cohesion forms the organizational basis for 
policies within the region across a range of issues. it enables the region to play a 
defining role in the relations between this group of states and the rest of the world. 
Regionalism Subordinated to Universalism
although rios developed before global international organizations, they became 
subordinate to them. Regionalism first developed in the Western Hemisphere. The 
international Union of american republics (iUar) was established in 1890, and the 
central american Union in 1907. in the early 20th century, the iUar, predecessor of 
the organization of american states, represented the multilateral regional approach 
driven by the Us and used in conjunction with the Monroe doctrine. obviously 
aware of the power relations which dominated that part of the world, the founders 
of the league of nations recognized the iUar in 1919. article 21 of the league’s 
covenant reads: ‘nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of 
international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings 
like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace’. 
in 1945, during the foundation of the league’s successor, the United nations 
(Un), the american states expressed their fear that the dumbarton oaks proposals 
for the Un would restrict the capabilities of regional arrangements or agencies with 
some autonomy in relation to the Un security council. the Us and other powers, 
however, feared that such independent regional arrangements could undermine 
the authority of the universal security council which they wanted to establish. 
a compromise was reached. the authority of regional arrangements would be 
accepted, as long as they recognized the Un’s objectives. regional arrangements 
were covered by a special chapter of the Un charter with three articles. article 52 
in chapter viii reads: 
nothing in the present charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or 
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace 
and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or 
agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United 
nations. 
although this Un chapter explicitly refers to security, this understanding of the 
combination of universalism and regionalism has also had an impact on regional 
arrangements for economic and social cooperation between states. in principle, 
the Un only recognizes and accepts economic regional arrangements when they 
correspond with Un objectives. Most european economic regional arrangements 
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in the 1930s – such as the British Commonwealth, the French customs union with 
its colonies, the Baltic entente and the trade agreement between Bulgaria, hungary, 
Rumania and Yugoslavia – were protectionist. The Oslo States were among the few 
that favoured free trade. after 1945, a protectionist orientation was hard to accept 
within the Un system, given the dominant free-trade orientation of the general 
agreement on tariffs and trade (gatt). however, the emergence of the gatt 
regime itself was a political compromise. the failure of the havana charter of a 
proposed international trade organization created a situation in which political 
support for gatt was exchanged for two major exceptions to the Most-favoured-
Nation Treatment as a fundamental GATT standard – namely, the creation of 
customs unions and common markets. in practice, gatt policies tried to limit these 
exceptions by arguing that regional arrangements with the character of customs 
unions or common markets were acceptable as long as ‘trade creation’ occurred and 
‘trade diversion’ was avoided (choi and caporaso 2001). Just like the Un, gatt 
has ensured that regional arrangements are required to declare their existence, which 
is followed by an assessment of whether regional arrangements are in line with 
gatt’s general policies. the world trade organization (wto) has maintained 
gatt’s method in this regard.
Re-active and Pro-active Regionalism
the driving forces behind the creation of rios have been external challenges and the 
search for strategies to cope with them. for examples of this, we need only look at 
the Us in the early 20th century, when the Us opted for a multilateral approach in the 
Western Hemisphere in which Europe was not to intervene, and again in 1944–1945, 
when the Us initiated the process of international institution building and soon after 
promoted western-european integration as a shield against communism (ikenberry 
2001). here, the external challenges, whether of an economic or a security nature, 
caused a re-action by the hegemon, which in international relations takes the form of 
an international cooperative alliance whose aim is to resist that challenge. although 
realists, who stress the importance of the hegemon’s role in creating regimes, assume 
that such alliances will be temporary, history has shown that cooperation often goes 
through a process of institutionalization which enhances the permanent character of 
cooperation.  
however, regionalism does not only result from hegemonic strategies, but also 
from the pro-active policies of weaker states in a certain region. in order to withstand 
external challenges they themselves may try to become stronger players by uniting 
on a regional basis. the reluctance of the ‘north’ to let the ‘south’ participate in the 
world economy on fairer, more equal terms was already an issue at the 1944 Bretton 
woods conference. it was decided, however, to give european recovery priority 
over southern development (Murphy 1997). this imbalance encouraged the latin 
american states to strengthen their position in the world economy through regional 
cooperation. this pro-active strategy was based on the ideas of the Dependency 
School. for them, regionalism became ‘a tool in the struggle to end the exploitative 
and dependent relationship between the developing countries (the south) and the 
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industrialized countries (the north)’ (fawcett 2000, 15). latin and central american 
rios, as well as others, are therefore to be seen as autonomous developments, rather 
than as copies of western european integration, although to some extent they have 
drawn on european ideas and experiences. 
on the subject of economic regional cooperation among developing states, andrew 
axline discerns four generations of regionalism. an analysis of this development may 
help to determine the conditions for successful regional cooperation in relation to 
legitimacy. The first generation consisted of attempts to transfer the policies of trade 
liberalization that had been applied in industrialized economies to an underdeveloped 
setting. examples of this are the latin american and caribbean free trade associations 
established during the 1960s and the association of south east asian nations. the 
second generation moved away from regionalism as a means of promoting trade 
and economic growth and used regionalism as a means of industrialization and 
economic development, known as ‘regional import substitution’. although promoted 
by the UN regional Economic Commissions, this conflicted with GATT policies. 
the third generation had a greater political impact since regional cooperation was 
heading towards the adoption of a common front among developing countries using 
regional policies as a form of ‘collective self-reliance’. ‘Joint policies within the 
region were augmented by regional external policies towards third countries and 
common negotiating positions in larger international forums’ (axline 1994, 3). this 
politicization led to turbulent times for rios, but although weakened most rios 
remained in existence. 
new regional starts (both as reorganizations and new institutions) made around 
the end of the cold war (during the late 1980s and early 1990s) mark a fourth 
generation, with a move back to trade liberalization measures ‘often on the basis of 
overlapping bilateral agreements rather than multilateral regional obligations’. the 
andean group is an example. another characteristic, revealed by Mercosur and the 
Southern African Development Community, is ‘specific cooperation on individual 
programmes among several countries’ (axline 1994, 4). the liberalization process of 
the 1980s, in line with the ideas of Milton friedman, promoted regionalism as a shield 
against the consequences of this ‘new’ globalization. in the insecure environment 
of the revived cold war of the 1980s, when bipolarity was still dominant, various 
regional organizations, often with a strong economic character, represented a serious 
attempt ‘to create a security consensus in a given area without the direct backing 
of a major external power’, according to louise fawcett (fawcett 2000, 16). the 
1990s represented a different era which allowed greater freedom to regionalism, the 
restraints of the cold war having vanished. furthermore, the Us actively promoted 
regionalism and even became a practitioner. feeling the need to manage the 
increased levels of interdependence in the region, the Us became a regional player 
through nafta (north american free trade agreement) and its ftaa strategy for 
the western hemisphere (free trade area for the americas). now, preferential trade 
agreements were used with increasing regularity to help prompt and consolidate 
economic and political reforms among prospective members, which had been ‘a 
rarity during prior eras’, according to Mansfield and Milner. Finally, regionalism 
was accompanied by ‘high levels of economic interdependence, a willingness by 
the major economic actors to mediate trade disputes, and a multilateral (that is, 
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the gatt/wto) framework that assists them in doing so and that helps them to 
organize trade relations’ (Mansfield and Milner 1999, 601).
Conditions for Successful Regional Cooperation
an analysis of the hampering, stagnation and failure of economic rios in their 
ongoing evolution as described above produces at least four conditions which must 
be met for successful regional cooperation, two at the level of the state and two at 
the level of the RIO. States engaging in regional cooperation must have sufficient 
‘stateness’, as well as sufficient and stable domestic support. RIOs, in turn, must be 
able to produce an acceptable distribution of benefits (or losses) and contribute to an 
understanding among their member states’ citizens of their double allegiance (both 
national and regional). 
the first condition refers to a nation-state’s need for sufficient and viable 
institutions in order to cooperate regionally. its political, economic and social systems 
must be developed and flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances as a result 
of external influences while maintaining political and administrative continuity. 
this ‘stateness’ was lacking in the 1960s, when newly-created african states began 
to function as independent but still inadequately equipped entities. a lack of state 
strength and its negative impact on regionalism are also found more recently as the 
result of state failure. ‘in many parts of the post-colonial world political instability, 
civil war, economic mismanagement, and environmental degradation interact to 
undermine the cohesion of state structures, to erode the economic base and social 
fabric of many weak states, and to produce a deadly downward spiral leading towards 
disintegration and anarchy’ (hurrell 2000, 67).
the second condition is that, given the distributive consequences of cooperation, 
governments engaged in regional cooperation must be able to gain support from 
within their domestic system widely enough to continue and intensify integration. 
‘those groups suffering losses due to a particular policy or changes in a policy will 
oppose it, while those benefiting from the policy will support it. Various domestic 
groups thus will demand different policies, and a government’s economic policy 
choices often will reflect the underlying preferences of the strongest and best-
organized interests within society’ (Mansfield and Milner 1997, 12). Governments, 
therefore, must remain aware that the discriminatory effects of regionalism may 
endanger their popularity, particularly if they want to intensify cooperation.
the third condition for success is that governments should agree not only on 
common policies contributing to the region’s development, but also on an acceptable 
distribution of the benefits between them. The 1960s showed that if agreed 
mechanisms for the (re)distribution of gains and losses from integration are absent, 
polarization arises between ‘growth’ and ‘stagnation’ poles (cf. Axline 1977, 83–8). 
latin american experiences during the same era reveal three problems which beset 
integration endeavours (cf. Macbean and Snowden 1981, 187–8):
 
the distribution of costs and benefits, especially when dynamic destabilizing 1.
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tendencies emerged that seemed to benefit most those already better off; 
the incipient politicization of the integration process; and 
the necessity among partners to agree on underlying policy goals, which 
became problematic given the high degree of politicization and strong 
nationalist feelings. 
If the costs and benefits of regional integration are unevenly distributed among 
the participating states, those not benefiting from them will oppose policies that will 
bring regional gains. this also raises the issue of identity: does national identity 
prevail in such situations, or is there sufficient regional identity to counterbalance 
any nationalist feelings?
this leads us to the fourth condition: that governments and populations develop 
a sense of ‘double allegiance’ which combines national and regional understandings 
in such ways that further integration is not blocked. this implies that governments 
are capable of successfully playing ‘two-level games’, in which they are aware of 
national preferences and domestic support and also manage to look for opportunities 
to intensify regional integration and to win domestic support for them, even when 
integration can bring potential costs with it. such situations require awareness among 
citizens that they are both national subjects and participants in a rio. the term ‘double 
allegiance’ refers to a situation in which national allegiance remains undiminished 
while citizens develop a secondary allegiance which allows regionalism to continue 
its existence or to intensify cooperation (cf. Milward 1995, 19). the creation of 
this secondary allegiance also depends on the rio. the minimum to be expected is 
that a rio which seeks to intensify cooperation also tries to receive support from 
the citizens of its member states, either by engaging them and their representatives 
in the common endeavour, or by providing transparency about what is taking place 
within it. 
The first and the third condition for successful regional cooperation (‘stateness’ 
and ‘rioness’) can be related to control legitimacy, the second and the fourth 
condition (domestic support and double allegiance) to input legitimacy.
Identifying Input, Control and Output Legitimacy
in order to establish whether economic rios display any of the three forms of 
legitimacy, indicators for each of the three forms need to be established. if economic 
rios have higher aspirations with regard to regional integration (establishing, 
resuming, or intensifying cooperation), their concern for legitimacy should increase, 
not only with output legitimacy (effectiveness), but also with input and control 
legitimacy (support and transparency). the subordination of regional to universal 
organizations can be related to output legitimacy because it presupposes the universal 
organizations’ consent for regionalism. this leads to the following indicators of 
input, control and output legitimacy of economic rios.
with regard to input legitimacy, it can be argued that inputs coming from actors 
other than governments contribute to this kind of legitimacy. it is assumed that, if 
such representation is taking place, often in a consultative form, governments have 
2.
3.
Closing or Widening the Gap?56
felt the need to increase the organization’s legitimacy by engaging actors involved 
in domestic or international politics. indicators are therefore representations by such 
actors as: 1) parliamentarians, 2) interest groups, 3) non-governmental organizations 
(ngos) with a consultative status, 4) experts, 5) subnational authorities, and 6) 
igos with an observer status.
with regard to control legitimacy, it can be argued that the presence of independent 
bodies playing a role alongside governments during the decision-making process 
within a rio represents this kind of legitimacy. it is assumed that governments and 
rios establish such international bodies in order to increase control legitimacy. 
they contribute to checking and balancing the principals (governments) and their 
involvement provides greater transparency and accountability than if governments 
were the sole decision makers. indicators are the availability of: 1) independent 
secretariats and supranational organs, 2) dispute settlement bodies (tribunals, 
courts), 3) autonomous monetary institutions (for instance, involving central bank 
governors), 4) ombudspersons and auditors, and 5) parliamentary structures with 
co-decision powers.
with regard to output legitimacy, it can be argued that recognition by authoritative 
igos such as the Un or gatt represents this kind of legitimacy for economic rios. 
it is assumed that by seeking such recognition, economic rios will improve their 
effectiveness and thus their output legitimacy. the same goes for formal cooperative 
agreements with other international or regional organizations. indicators are the 
presence of: 1) an observer status granted by the UN, 2) notification by the GATT/
wto, 3) an observer status granted by the wto, 4) an observer status granted by 
other igos, and 5) cooperative agreements with other igos. 
Input, Control and Output Legitimacy in 31 Economic RIOs
in order to investigate the issue of legitimacy empirically, 31 economic rios were 
selected as characteristic of their region: eight from africa, four from asia and the 
Pacific, five from the Middle East and Western Asia, nine from the Western Hemisphere 
and five from Central and Eastern Europe/former Second World (Western Europe 
was excluded). in order to ensure comparable data one encyclopaedic handbook was 
used as a source for all organizations (europa directory 2001).
table 4.1 provides an overview of these rios and their main characteristics. 
the most common kinds of economic cooperation found among the selected rios 
(sometimes in combination) are: booster organizations (11), preferential trade 
agreements (11), customs unions (8) and free trade areas (6), with only two common 
currencies (monetary union), one common market and one economic union (see table 
4.1). with regard to integration perspectives beyond preferential trade agreements, 
two rios will remain a free trade area and two a customs union, whereas 16 also 
aim towards a common market, economic union and/or monetary union (one even a 
political union). This number confirms the dynamic character of integration assumed 
by hurrell. But it must also be mentioned that the more intensive forms of integration 
remain small in number (which is different from the purpose of becoming more 
intensive). 13 of these 31 rios went through a process of reorganization, most of 
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them during the 1990s (9) and 1980s (3). these reorganizations indicate that these 
economic rios were able to adapt to serious changes in their environment and 
confirm Axline’s move from the third to the fourth generation of regionalism (back 
to measures of trade liberalization due to the new economic mood of the 1980s).
although most of the rios selected are primarily economic organizations, nearly 
half of them (15) include a security dimension (institutionally: 12; ‘on the agenda’: 
3), an issue hinted at by fawcett and mentioned by hurrell as a factor relevant to 
regional awareness. five security dimensions are found in booster organizations, 
four in preferential trade agreements, three in free trade areas, two in customs unions 
and one in an economic union. this implies that economic regional cooperation, 
irrespective of type, does not need to restrict itself to economic issues.
tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 provide the various forms of legitimacy (input, control 
and output) found according to the indicators discussed above. The general finding 
of the investigation with regard to the three forms of legitimacy is that all forms of 
legitimacy (input, control and output) are found in the group of 31 rios. comparing 
the three forms of legitimacy, output legitimacy proves the strongest of the three 
with a ‘total value’ of 74, followed by input legitimacy at 52 and control legitimacy 
at 43. this order was determined by assessing the legitimacy aspect of each rio 
(with a scale ranging from ‘absent’ to ‘very strong’, in combination with grades 
ranging from zero to five; see legend under Table 4.2) and calculating a total score 
for all 31 RIOs. Referring to the two views discussed in the first section (Dahl’s 
sceptical view and grant and Keohane’s accountability view) we may conclude that 
the data does not support the sceptical view. input and control legitimacy may be 
weaker than output legitimacy, but they are clearly present.
Output legitimacy is expected by both views. the subordination of regionalism 
to universalism implies that, in order to perform, rios need to pursue the same 
goals as universal igos, such as the Un and gatt/wto, and/or need to conclude 
formal agreements with other IGOs. The findings shown in Table 4.4 confirm these 
expectations. According to the five indicators, output legitimacy was found in 17 
RIOs having a UN observer status, 19 providing GATT/WTO notifications, 13 
having a wto observer status, two having an observer status elsewhere, and 23 
having concluded cooperative agreements with other igos. conclusion: given the 
total numbers of observer statuses (32), notifications (19) and agreements (23), RIOs 
are recognized by universal ios, thus enhancing their output legitimacy.
Input Legitimacy is not expected by dahl but hinted at by grant and Keohane. 
It is related to the necessity of finding sufficient domestic support in combination 
with an understanding of the evolving integration. according to the six indicators, 
input legitimacy was found in 19 parliamentary structures (of which two were just 
proposals), 19 arrangements for interest group representation, nine arrangements 
for ngo representation, three arrangements for the inclusion of experts, and one 
arrangement for subnational authorities representation. although these indicators 
do no necessarily reveal their actual influence (see, for instance, Malamud and De 
sousa, chapter 5), it must be observed that parliamentarians are involved in nearly 
two-thirds of the cases (19 of 31 rios). this equals the number of arrangements for 
interest group representation (19) and is roughly twice as large as the arrangements for 
ngo representation (9). seven rios provide outsiders (igos) with the opportunity 
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to observe directly what is going on within their organization (see table 4.1). the 
numbers of other indicators (experts, subnational authorities) remain small. the 
conclusion is, then, that the numbers of parliamentary structures and interest group 
representation (both 19) indicate that input legitimacy matters, mostly through these 
channels, rather than through ngo or igo representation. it must be observed that 
the engagement of parliamentarians in this group of rios is a rather recent, post-
Cold War phenomenon – one arrangement dates back to 1979, three to 1989, nine to 
the 1990s and four to 2002.
Control Legitimacy is not expected by dahl but is hinted at by grant and Keohane 
and relates to providing transparency and checks and balances vis-à-vis governments 
in order to avoid the problems that beset earlier integration endeavours. according 
to the five indicators control legitimacy was found in four active secretariats, 
19 arrangements of dispute settlement (often as a court of justice: 12; two being 
planned), 16 arrangements with autonomous monetary institutions (of which nine 
involving central bank governors), and four auditing arrangements; no co-decisive 
parliamentary structures were found (see table 4.3). control legitimacy is thus most 
visible in judicial procedures (in 19 of 31 rios) as well as in autonomous monetary 
arrangements (16). control by other arrangements, such as active secretariats or 
independent commissions (4), auditors (4) or co-decisive parliaments (0), is rare. 
the conclusion is, then, that control legitimacy is present, and is effective mostly 
through judicial and monetary channels. dispute settlement arrangements often 
are part of a rio’s design, but it may take a while before they start functioning. 
independent monetary arrangements arise during the process of integration. 
table 4.5 shows the distribution of the results of the major legitimacy indicators 
among the various kinds of cooperation among the 31 rios (this time combinations 
are neglected). For instance, seven out of 11 booster organizations, five out of nine 
preferential trade agreements, three out of five free trade areas and all five customs 
unions have parliamentary arrangements. Five out of 11 booster organizations, five 
out of nine preferential trade agreements, three out of five free trade areas and all 
five custom unions have a dispute settlement arrangement. The table indicates that 
all kinds of cooperation display almost all of the ten legitimacy indicators to some 
extent. there are hardly any empty cells (with the major exception of the economic 
union column). this implies that awareness of legitimacy is a matter of regionalism, 
independent of its specific form. It underlines the previous conclusion that Dahl’s 
sceptical vision with regard to input and control legitimacy is disputable.
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Table 4.5 Legitimacy Indicators According to Kinds of Regional Cooperation
KIND OF REGIONAL COOPERATION
Booster 
organization 
n=11
preferential 
trade 
agreement 
n=9
free 
trade 
area
n=5
customs 
Unions
n=5
econo-
mic 
Union
n=1
INPUT 
LEGITIMACY
parliamen-
tarians
7 5 3 5 0
interest groups 6 7 3 2 1
ngos with 
consultative 
status
3 3 3 0 0
igos with 
observer 
status
4 2 0 1 0
CONTROL 
LEGITIMACY
dispute 
settlement 
Bodies
5 5 3 5 1
autonomous 
Monetary 
institutions
3 6 3 3 1
OUTPUT 
LEGITIMACY
Un observer 
status
5 5 3 3 1
gatt/wto 
Notification
0 9 5 5 0
wto observer 
status
4 5 2 2 0
cooperative 
agreements 
with igos
7 8 4 4 1
